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Monte Cassino: April 30-May 23, 1944, Part III(a)
Romuald E. Lipinski, 12 Podolski Lancers Regt.
2nd Polish Corps

Reflections

We had against us crack German division of paratroopers. The 1-st Paratroop Division was under the command of 48 year old Gen. Richard Heindrich. Directly against us was the third regiment of the 1-st division. Further north there was the 100-th Mountain Regiment. Their defense was based on resistance points that could support each other in case of need with machine guns, mortars and other weapons. Their bunkers were well camouflaged and the attackers could find them only after being shot at. The paratroopers were well trained to fight in small groups or individually, tough, ruthless soldiers, recruited either from fanatical Nazis or from gullible young men who believed that they are the master race and soon the entire world will be under their domination. There were some cases that give testimony of their fanaticism. For example, a badly wounded soldier refused blood transfusion. He preferred to die rather to have his enemy's blood in his veins. Germans were using all kinds of tricks to increase our losses. For example, at one point just taken by our troops, a man appeared in British uniform, seating at a distance in front of our soldiers. When our guys started to call him in Polish and in English he disappeared. As soon as he was gone there was a barrage of mortar shells on our troops. Evidently, he was a German sent to find out about location of our troops. Upon leaving the monastery, Germans left a lot of mines with delayed detonators. One mine exploded in the area of the monastery five days after capture of the monastery. Among the prisoners taken near the monastery there were four officers including a battalion commander. Our commander of the convoy asked Capt. Beyer, German officer, about the passage through the mine field.

"Even if knew I would not tell you. The mine field was put for you and you have to find it" - was the response.

In view of such a response they were ordered to go directly through the mine field. They went without saying anything. Four of them were killed by the exploding mines, but they did not reveal the safe passage.

After the battle our troops were very popular among the allies. Wherever we appeared we were welcomed as heroes of Monte Cassino. Sometimes, when somebody was hitchhiking, a high ranking officer be it a British, American or French, would stop invite us to his car, offer something to drink, take us wherever we wanted to go. Poles, they invited us to their table and we had a feast. Some of them were of Polish origin and they spoke some Polish, which helped us to communicate. From other tables came other American soldiers and we had to tell
The Italian campaign in general and battle of Monte Cassino in particular, has been a subject of controversy right from the beginning. There has been a lot written questioning the judgment of the ally commanders. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, wrote that the entire campaign was "tactically the most absurd and strategically the most senseless campaign of the whole war" (History, Vol. I, p. 407). Gen. Francis Tuker, Commander of the 4-th Indian Division which was practically wiped out during the second battle of Monte Cassino wrote that the strategy of British commanders is an obsession that they have to attack the enemy at the point where he is strong rather that take advantage of his weakness ("...It is an extraordinary obsession in British commanders' minds that they must challenge the enemy's strength rather than play on his weakness. Perhaps it is a little bit unsporting to pit strength against weakness" - History, Vol. I, p. 408). Would it be easier to dislodge Germans from their positions elsewhere? Probably there is no answer to this question. Most of the Italian peninsula is covered with mountains, the terrain that is ideal to defensive warfare. The only other segment that could offer more favorable terrain conditions was on the Adriatic coast, a rolling type of countryside. That area would be favorable to a tank action and perhaps there Germans would be more vulnerable. But Cassino was on the way to Rome and it is well known that all generals are prim ballerinas anxious to get their name on front page of news papers. As a matter of fact, if Gen. Mark Clark, commander of the 5-th American Army, instead of going straight to Rome did strike retreating Germans across the Italian peninsula he could have cut off their several armies and therefore shorten the war in Italy by several months. Instead, pursuing his desire to be the first to take Rome, he went to the Eternal City allowing the Germans to sneak out unharmed. He was under congressional investigation for his tactics not only for his Rome handling, but even more so for his ill conceived offensive at Monte Cassino during the first battle in January 1943. At that time the Rapido river was swollen from heavy rains and launching and assault under these conditions was against any common sense. At that time the plan was for the US 36th (Texas) Division of the US II Corps to force crossings over the Gari river to enable Combat Command B of the US 1st Armored Division to pass through and debouch into the Liri Valley. The attack was a complete fiasco. Most of the troops of the 36-th Division did not even cross the river, much less of providing any menace to the well entrenched Germans. The entire division was practically wiped out.
When the frontal attack against the Liri valley entrance failed Clark decided to assault the Cassino complex from the north. He requested that the US 34th Infantry Division cross the Rapido river north of Cassino, approximately where we were going four months later, and attack southwards in the mountains north and behind Monte Cassino. This attack was coordinated with the General Juin's French Expeditionary Corps. The Americans penetrated the northern outskirts of the town but withdrew after strong German counter-attacks. At one point the lead troops of the 34th Division advanced within five hundred meters of Point 593 on Snakehead Ridge, and, on the left, they were on Point 445, little more than four hundred meters from the Abbey. But again, after bitter fighting , they were forced to withdraw.

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