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I joined the RAF in September 1941 to become a radio/Wireless Mechanic (the name Radar hadn’t been applied then). After completing my training I was posted to a CH station at Northam in North Devon, but was only there for four weeks, then being sent to TRE at Malvern for a Type 7000 course. Very hush-hush at that time, Type 7000 was also known as GEE and was the first Radio Navigational Aid; originally suggested in 1939 but shelved at that time because defensive radar was much more important. However, in 1942 things had changed dramatically and it was obvious something had to be done to improve navigation, so the first GEE chains were commissioned.
By the beginning of 1943 more accurate navigational aids were needed to assist bombers to find and bomb targets in adverse conditions, and Type 9000, also known as Oboe, was used by the pathfinder force. This system is claimed to have been the most accurate blind-bombing system developed by either side during the war, but it suffered from one serious problem - only one aircraft could be handled at a time and so was not really suitable for use on the large bombing raids which were becoming the norm. This led to the development of Type 100 (GH), which theoretically could handle up to 100 aircraft at once (hence Type 100?); and was almost Oboe in reverse - instead of the ground stations interrogating the aircraft and issuing the instruction to bomb, the aircraft interrogated the ground stations and bombing was done by the navigator/bomb aimer.
I was posted to one of the first two GH stations, at Grangewood, on the cliffs at Fairlight, near Hastings, in the autumn of 1943, and after the system had been proved and adopted by both the RAF and the American Air Forces a further station was set up. Early in 1944 one set of equipment was removed from each of the stations to form mobile stations, though we didn’t know at that time these were intended to go to the continent after D-Day; initially they were set up near Swanage and in Cornwall and used for the many bombing raids along the whole coast of France in the early months of 1944.
It had been decided at the time the system was first set up that the ground stations would only transmit during the period aircraft were expected to be over the target, so our operational periods were usually very short. I was senior mechanic on duty for the night watch on the 5th June 1944 and when we arrived at the site we learned from the off going watch that while they had been operational earlier in the evening nothing was planned for the night; we were therefore amazed to receive a signal at about 23.15 telling us of an operation to last from23.45 until 05.00 hrs, with a target given in the middle of the channel off Boulogne. There was a standing order that if strange operational orders were received the CO or Senior NCO were to be notified so that they could decide whether they felt they should come to the technical site, but the senior operator and I decided that we didn’t need to let them know because with the target we had been given it could only be an exercise (probably training bomber crews to use us).
About 01.00 hrs the CO arrived - he had been out in Hastings and was cycling home to his billet at Fairlight and said he had heard aircraft “stooging around” and wondered if we knew what was happening. He stayed about ½ hr then went home. Just before it got light next morning the guns on the enemy coast opened up, and when day dawned we were surprised to see a fleet of tugs hauling peculiar shapes down the channel. (Later found to be parts of the Mulberry Harbours).
We learned later that day that we had provided the navigation for Operation Glimmer - 8 aircraft of 218 Squadron flying a mile apart for a set period of a few minutes towards the French coast, then turning back for another (shorter) period, then reversing direction again, dropping a special form of “window”, the whole operation giving the impression of an invasion fleet sailing at about 7 knots towards Boulogne and which had been 100% successful. This needed very precise navigation. We were also very pleased to learn later that a similar op had been done by 617 (Dambusters) Squadron using Oboe (Operation Moonlight) but that had not been so successful. It later turned out that the problem there had been that an overenthusiastic attack on the radar stations around Fecamp had put them all out of action when one was supposed to have been left working so that the feint fleet could be seen.

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