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FLYING CONTROL, MAURIPUR & JIWANI

About the end of August 1943 I was posted to a Flying Control course at Mauripur, where we had first landed in India in March 1942; where we had seen Colonel Scott and his B17s. I set off by myself on the long railway journey from Madras to Karachi. From memory it took five or six days and involved a number of changes of train. I have hazy memories of spending a day or more on the Nagpur state railway which was narrow gauge, less than three feet.

The Flying Control course lasted a month. It was run by a W/C, his deputy was a S/L Saul. S/L Saul was looked on with great respect as he had been co-pilot with Charles Kingsford-Smith on some of his epic record breaking flights in the 1930s. The lecturers were full of enthusiasm having had experience on Bomber Command aerodromes in the UK and believing that as soon as Germany was finished with there would be such a flood of aircraft from the UK to South East Asia that we would be overwhelmed. About twenty chaps were on the course, about half of them were flying airmen, the others had been selected from various non-flying appointments.

At the end of the course I was posted to Jiwani in Buluchistan. Jiwani was about three miles east of the Iranian border and a mile inland from the sea. The country side was just rugged desert. The landing ground was a two thousand yard long strip of hard sand, free of rocks. About two miles from the aerodrome was the Imperial Airways flying boat station. Two or three times a week and Imperial Airways ‘Empire’ flying boat would alight at their flying boat base.

In between flying-boat movements Imperial Airways ‘Ensign’ four engined passenger aircraft would land on the aerodrome. The Imperial Airways signals system was excellent, their manager at Jiwani knew exactly when an aircraft would be landing. They had a building on the aerodrome not far from the watch office. When an ‘Ensign’ landed the Imperial Airways station manager and his staff would be waiting and would escort the passengers from the aircraft to their building which they used as a refreshment centre, assembly point, office, waiting lounge etc. After the ‘Ensign’ took off all Imperial Airways personnel would disappear back to their flying boat station. There was always the closest co-operation between Imperial Airways and the RAF. As well as the flying boats and the ‘Ensigns’, Imperial Airways also used a small number of ‘Lockheed 12' twin engine airliners.

The CO of the RAF station was Major Bodley of the South African air force. He was a pilot and what we would now call a colourful character. He was six feet tall, athletic, outgoing, jolly, little respect for authority, friendly, not particularly military. He was always where he was needed using local resources to do whatever was required. Like the Earl of Bandon and W/C Monroe he would talk on equal terms to the ‘erks’ and was looked on with affection by all.

As well as Major Bodley the station had a strength of about a dozen officers. These were the station adjutant, MO, Signals Officer, Engineering Officer, Flying Control Officer (myself), two Indian Air Force Officers who ran the Met Office, a Captain Johnson of the Royal Engineers, and various others that I cannot now call to mind. The strength of the sergeants mess was about the same. In all, from memory, I estimate the total strength at about a hundred.

The RAF station took its name from a nearby village. Some of the locals made a living by fishing from boats, how all the others managed to keep body and soul together I don’t know. There always seemed to be plenty of Indians, the women always carrying babies and living in poverty.

As well as the RAF and Imperial Airways, Jiwani was home to a flight of Po2's of the Russian Air Force and a team of civilian scientists headed by a Russian professor. This organisation was engaged in the study and elimination of locusts. Swarms of locusts flew across this area of desert in their search for food. The locusts settled on the ground and night and could not fly on again until the sun was up and gave sufficient heat to dry the dew off their wings.

As well as the Po2's, the flight had a Royal Air Force ‘Anson’ which had been fitted up with tanks containing insecticide and spraying equipment. Every morning before dawn the Po2's were out on reconnaissance looking for swarms of locusts grounded by the dew. When a swarm was found a signal was sent giving the position and the Anson would take off and that swarm of locusts would be eliminated.

Standing near the watch office was a Vickers ‘Vildebeest’. This was one of a squadron that had passed through some months before. It had gone u/s and had been left behind and forgotten about. In spare moments the airmen examined it, and using much time, ingenuity, patience etc they were able to get the engine running. The ‘Vildebeest’ was a large single engine biplane torpedo bomber. From the manufacturers name plate it was seen this particular one was built in 1936. The Vildebeest had been superceded by the ‘Swordfish’.

After doing further work and examining the airframe minutely the airmen felt sufficiently confident to ask Major Bodley to give it some taxying trials. The major agreed. The engine was started and he carefully taxied around the landing strip. All appeared to go well and he turned to taxi across the aerodrome. To our surprise the Vildebeest became airborne, climbed to a thousand feet, made a couple of circuits of the aerodrome, landed and taxied back and parked near the watch office where it had started from.

When he stepped down from the Vildebeest the major said he had not set out to take off. He was doing a high speed taxying run across the aerodrome, examining his instruments, oil pressure, brake pressure etc. When he looked up over the side of the cockpit he was amazed to see he was airborne and climbing.
In the next few weeks the major flew the Vildebeest most days. Confidence in the aircraft now was such that the major applied to the Group Captain at Mauripur for authority to keep the aircraft at Jiwani to be used for communication flights. The Group Captain agreed and asked the major to fly the aircraft to Drigh Road where it would be given a thorough check over. So Major Bodley flew the Vildebeest to Drigh Road.

After a couple of weeks he contacted Drigh Road to enquire how the overhaul of the Vildebeest was progressing. He and the whole station were shattered to learn the reply was that as the type was obsolete it had been dismantled and struck off charge.

The ‘entomological flight’ was commanded by a Russian air force major and he had about twenty Russian air force personnel under his command, pilots and ground crews. They lived in their own barrack block and remained aloof from their British counterparts. Bread and other rations for all ranks were supplied by the British. All the bread for the camp was baked on the camp by the British in their cookhouse. At one time the cookhouse ran out of break making ingredients. Supplies were not expected for three days, so for that time emergency rations would be issued in lieu, (hard tack or ships biscuits). This was accepted by the British airmen.

The Russian major came over, somewhat crestfallen, to say his chaps were giving him a hard time regarding no bread. They had pointed out to him that Stalin had promised them bread not ships biscuits and could we do anything to help him out. Signals flew between Jiwani and Karachi and it was arranged and agreed that a Po2 would fly to Karachi and bring back as much bread as could be stowed on board. This flight was carried out and tranquility was restored. Living on ‘hard tack’ was not seen as a great hardship by the British.

The main reason for the aerodrome being at Jiwani as far as the RAF was concerned was to refuel reinforcement aircraft flying through to India, and this was going on all the time. Beaufighters, Mosquitos, Blenheim MkVs, Barracudas and Hurricanes were our main customers. The Hurricanes came through in batches of twelve at a time. On one occasion eleven Hurricane’s landed although twelve had taken off from Sharjah. None of the pilots had seen anything ‘request news’ to Sharjah and Jack produced not results. All the Hurricanes were refuelled, nine went on to Karachi and two flew back along the route they had flown before but nothing was seen. It was a great relief next morning about 09.00 hours to receive a signal from an Imperial Airways flying boat to say he had spotted a Hurricane down in the desert twenty miles west of Jiwani and a mile north of the coast.

Again Imperial Airways came to the rescue. They had a rescue launch and this was loaned willingly to the RAF with its experienced crew. A search party with rations and water set off along the coast, landed in an appropriate place, went ashore and inland and found the Hurricane. The pilot was a Greek. After take off from Sharjah his wireless had gone dead. About fifty miles west of Jiwani his engine had begun to fail. He could not call anybody and he could not keep up with the formation. He gradually lost height until he had to make a wheels up landing in the desert.

When he realised he had to spend the night out in the desert he ‘ripped’ his parachute to make himself a shelter. No doubt it was the white silk of the parachute that attracted the flying boat captain’s attention. The Hurricane pilot was greatly relieved to be rescued.

There was no direct road from Jiwani to Karachi. Motor vehicles had to be driven from Karachi to Quetta. Quetta is about three hundred miles north of Karachi. In 1935 Quetta was devastated by a severe earthquake. After Quetta the vehicles had to be driven another three hundred miles over desert roads in a south westerly direction to reach Jiwani. About the end of March 1944 there was a change of command at Jiwani, Major Bodley was posted away and S/L Speedy took over as CO.

Since October 1943 I had been Flying Control Officer at Jiwani and now by April 1944 there was much American activity in the area. Over the past months they had flown in much building material and had built huts as the beginning of a domestic camp. They continued to flying building material and put up more and bigger buildings. They were entirely self supporting, independent of the British altogether. They arranged their own rations. They did not accept RAF met forecasts or RAF signals. They set up their own signals station and their own met office. One of the C47's came in one day laden with building material, bags of cement, breeze blocks, a petrol driven cement mixer and a piano!

All rations and stores came to Jiwani by air. The RAF had an arrangement with Indian National Airways that they flew into Jiwani with their DC2s weekly. Personnel needing to travel to and/or from Karachi would get on the INA if convenient. Other than that chaps would make their own arrangements with the pilots of any RAF aircraft that was going in the right direction at the right time and had some spare room.

We received a signal from Karachi that they had seven or eight MT vehicles there that were allotted to Jiwani and that we were required to collect them. Our MT sergeant (Sgt Lee) was given the job of making all arrangements. He had done the trip before and knew all the difficulties. A few weeks before this a Hurricane from one of the convoys had gone u/s at Jiwani. Spares had been sent up by INA from Karachi and the Hurricane was now serviceable.

Off went Sgt Lee and his dozen MT drivers by various aircraft to Karachi. Next day off went S/L Speedy in the Hurricane. He was to attend various meetings and then go on a fortnights leave. As I was then the senior GD officer on the station I became acting CO and station routine orders were issued under my name. The engineering officer was a F/O Stallibrass, he had ideas of going out into the desert to recover the damaged Hurricane. He assembled tackle he thought he might need and with a couple of volunteers from the engineering staff he went off with a two ton Bedford truck. His idea was to get the kite up on its wheels, remove various awkward bits and get the sail up onto the back of the lorry such that he could tow it home.

At Karachi Sgt Lee appraised the vehicles that were to comprise his convoy, he arranged water containers, spare petrol and oil and other gear to cope with emergencies. Five days after he had left Jiwani a signal was received from Quelta to tell us the MT convoy had left, making for Jiwani. As dusk approached the convoy had not arrived. After dark, standing on the watch office roof, lights could be seen twinkling in the direction of the road and it was presumed these must be the headlights of the convoy. When first seen these lights must have been ten to fifteen miles away. For over an hour the lights were watched as they grew brighter and eventually the convoy rolled triumphantly into the station and parked in the MT yard.

All the drivers were exhausted and it was obvious Sgt Lee was in a bad way. He was taken into the sick bay by the MO (F/O Gilbert-Fraser) and put to bed there. Next morning at about 11.00 hours the MO came to me and said he was extremely worried about Sgt Lee. The MO was unable to make any diagnosis or bring about any improvement, it was his opinion that Sgt Lee should be got into hospital as soon as possible. I therefore sent off a signal ‘immediate’ priority to Karachi asking for an air ambulance. No reply came to this signal.

About 15.00 hours the INA DC2 supply flight landed and amongst the passengers was a corporal medical orderly. He said he had been sent in reply to our signal to assist our MO. Naturally our MO was aghast at this snub from Karachi. About 16.30 hours an American C47 landed and parked near the watch office. It was flown by an American Lieutenant and was another load of building material which he said they would unload in the morning. About 18.00 hours the MO came to me again and said Sgt Lee’s condition was deteriorating and he must be got to hospital.

I went across to the American mess, found the pilot of the C47, told him the situation and asked him if he would fly Sgt Lee to hospital. He was very willing to do this if we could get his kite unloaded. The entire strength of the RAF station descended on the C47 and had it unloaded and ready for flight in about half an hour. It was now about seven o’clock in the evening and dark. While the C47 was being unloaded Flying Control had laid out and lit a ‘goose neck’ flarepath. At Jiwani we still used the old pre-war paraffin goose neck flares for night flying.

Soon after 7 o’clock that evening the C47 thundered off the runway and disappeared in the blackness in the direction of Karachi. On board was the American crew, Sgt Lee on a stretcher and two medical orderlies. At the expected time we received the ‘arrival’ signal from Karachi. Then all settled into an uneasy calm. About 15.00 hours the next day amongst the other signals traffic came a signal to say that Sgt Lee had died in hospital. No cause of death was given, nor was the cause ever given. Our MO was concerned, was it infectious? Were any of the other MT drivers on that convoy threatened? It seemed to us that the authorities at Karachi were not particularly interested in their satellite at Jiwani. I don’t remember any senior officer ever coming on a tour of inspection, nor do I remember any padre ever paying a visit.

F/O Stallibrass was out in the desert with his assistants working on the damaged Hurricane. There being no other means of contacting him a ‘runner’ was organised. He went off carrying a written signal from me telling him what had happened to Sgt Lee and that they were to abandon the Hurricane and return to camp. By the time they received my signal they had the Hurricane up on its wheels. They reluctantly picked up their gear and all returned to camp. Whatever it was that killed Sgt Lee never affected anybody else. In the approximately eight months that I was at Jiwani I don’t recall anybody else having to be kept in the sick quarters or sent to hospital at Karachi.

In my time there no serious accidents occurred on the aerodrome. A Mk V Blenheim overshot the landing ground and was wrecked. A Beaufighter’s undercarriage collapsed. One of Imperial Airways Lockheed 12s had one undercarriage leg collapse. A tail wheel tyre burst on a Mosquito. These were just incidents, no one was injured. Imperial Airways repaired their Lockheed 12 themselves and it flew away.

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