蜜芽传媒

Z S Report by L R Allwright

INTRODUCTION.

On November 13th. 1941 the Ark Royal was abandoned for the sinking hulk she became when German torpedoes struck her only thirty miles from Gibraltar the loss of that great ship brought about some exceptional circumstances for the British High Command to deal with.
Almost immediately it became necessary to provide air cover in the Gibraltar area, an air cover so potent as would almost overnight neutralise the effectiveness of 鈥淯鈥� Boat activity and to give cover to the homeward bound convoy due to sail on December 14th.
The big problem at that time was one of having somewhere suitable from which the right aircraft could operate as nothing like a runway existed in the area. Flight evaluation tests had to be made and the need was for Pilots of exceptional skill and experience and of necessity the whole crew would have to be the most expert of any "U" Boat hunters to be found anywhere in the World and all would need the nerve and courage to the point of dedication and the stamina of an Ox. The combination of such special aircrews as well as the right aircraft, which at that time had to be Lockheed Hudson presented a bit of a dilemma.
Joubert could supply the answer within his crack 233 Squadron at the time fully committed to the Brest patrols. The need at Gibraltar took precedence and once that was decided then the chances of an early warning on the movement of the German Battleships from Brest became slim. Indeed does such a decision not show a change in priorities?

The Gibraltar venture proved highly successful with the homeward bound convoy reaching homeport with only small losses and the level of 鈥淯" Boat activity in the area almost non-existent. The venture also marked the beginning of the end of the Battle of the Atlantic.

If any doubts exist that tremendous efforts were made by those first ever flyers at North Front Gibraltar, in December 1941 it is only necessary to try to evaluate just one or two aspects of the issue to be convinced. The Hudson With a minimum flying speed of around 90-100 m.p.h. would have to make do with a length of runway that stretched only from the Mediterranean the main road that ran into La Linea the surface of the run being more like a cart track than that of a runway.

As the homeward bound convoy moved further away the tenacity of those aircrews was such that in order to be able to continue to reach out it became necessary to fit both Belly and fuselage tanks virtually turning the aircraft into a flying tanker with almost three thousand gallons of 100 octane petrol on board. That plus all other equipment and a four man crew must have given rise to doubts in their minds as to whether a lift off was possible let alone the fact that after more than a fifteen hour patrol the Pilot was then expected to safely land back on that same small patch. Yet the patrols went on unerringly.

But not for them the glory as hindsight show鈥檚 that instead of the British nation being able to rejoice that such men were available when the need arose within months they were being condemned as incompetents and sad to say much of the criticism came from their own. Officially, it seems, the whole issue has just been ignored.

The abuse has continued down through the years with much being said and written of the issue of the escape of the three German Battleships from Brest and the subsequent condemnation of Royal Air Force Coastal Command. It surprises me that the Air Force has never seen fit to challenge many of the statements that have been made.
How could Coastal Command be held responsible for the failure of the vital early warning that the ships were on the move when in fact the very Squadron that would have assured the warning had, by force of events, been virtually taken apart to provide the necessary men and machines to avert a far greater disaster. Surely the advantages of success at Gibraltar by far outweighed the small tactical gain made by the escape of the three German Battleships.
Probably the two loneliest men on the day of the escape, February 11th 1942 was the chief of Coastal Command Sir Phillip Joubert and First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound.
Both men must have been fully aware of the gamble they had taken with the decision to break up 233 Squadron a decision that automatically had ruled out any long term planning for the event and when it became apparent that the immediate detection of the Battleships movement had failed the two men must have known then the only thing to do was to ride out the storm. In all conscience the right decision had been made.
With the hope that even after so many years some slight recognition can still be given and perhaps even official records can be changed to include the episode of the Gibraltar convoy I have, to the best of my ability, set down in the following pages an account of all that took place within 233 Squadron from St Eval of 1941 to about April 1943 at North Front. Written in the form of a report back it gives a clear indication of what it was like to be at North Front Gibraltar in the first year of it鈥檚 Use as an airfield. Included are as many photographs and documents as it was possible to gather up in those days, which will no doubt help to substantiate the written word.
1158349 Leslie Robert Allwright

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