蜜芽传媒

Z .S. Report By L.R. Allwright.

It was early in the year of 1941 that information via our own aircraft then operating out of Aldergrove in Northern Ireland.
As part of the Atlantic battle force and also other intelligence sources which seemed to indicate the possibility of a large German battleship moving into the English Channel.

Sir Phi1lip Joubert, chief of Coastal Command, took note of these reports and in order to keep fully informed about such possibilities decided to move his crack mobile 233 Squadron out of Ulster and to have it operating from St.Eva1 in Cornwall.
By now 233 Squadron had been operating with American built Hudson aircraft since the war began and had reached a high level of efficiency to become a very formidable squadron in the field of anti "U" boat. Warfare.
233 Squadron had been involved in many operations out over the North Sea and to Norway from Leuchars in Scotland the North Atlantic and Iceland from Northern Ireland. It was clear why we were beginning to be known as the mobile squadron of Coastal Command. Joubert, our chief, had seen to it that these planes were fitted with all possible up to date equipment and all concerned aircrews and ground staff were now extremely expert in the use of their A.S.V. (Radar) equipment, which was playing such an important part in the seeking out of "U" boats.
One of the latest innovations of about that time had been the fitting of two cannons in the nose of some of our Hudson鈥檚 to counteract the practice of "U" boats to remain surfaced and to fire their deck guns at the oncoming attacking aircraft.
Hudson鈥檚 were originally designed and built for use as civil airliners but were quickly adapted for military use and proved to be very suitable for the long-range patrols undertaken by Coastal Command. With a crew of four, patrols of up to l5hrs duration were often undertaken and in the bomb bay four 250lbs depth charges when used for anti-sub work or bombs when used for bombing. Protective armament consisted of a Boulton Paul fully swivelling gun turret fitted with two Browning machine guns. A safe flying speed of, approximately 100m.p.h. with a top speed of 250 plus. These Hudson鈥檚 crewed by the right men, of which 233 squadron now had in abundance, were proving a ruthless weapon against the "u" boat menace of those times.

On arrival at St Eval we soon discovered that the prevailing conditions there would make for a complete change in the way the squadron normally operated and life was to become a bit more tedious. As others write about aircraft operating from St Eval of those days as if things were normal which only goes to show how little they know their Subject and just for the record I should like to write here a brief eye witness account Of the sort of problems that would be met by any squadron unlucky enough to be sent to St Eval in 1941.

Although St Eval was built before the war for permanent use as a R.A. F. aerodrome it had been subjected to very heavy bombing during the blitz, which had devastated the whole place. Not a building was left standing in one piece and many airman were killed and wounded when the whole of the living quarters were completely wiped out. No cookhouse or washing facilities were now available. This meant, of course, that all personnel attached to St Eval had to be domiciled off the station and because the place was in such an isolated position the nearest place with enough accommodation was nearly twenty miles away around Newquay.

Everything that could possibly provide accommodation for airman in and around Newquay was commandeered for that purpose. Hotels and a lot of large or small houses were all being used in this way and my own accommodation with many other airmen was in a large house called 鈥淧orth Veor鈥� which was at Morgan Porth just outside of Newquay. All the holiday Cafes had been requisitioned to provide us with meals and I was booked in at a place called 鈥淲ipsadary鈥� for my meals. The day would start very early to be at the cafe for breakfast before 7am finish breakfast and climb aboard the service transport Vehicle for the 15 to 20 mile trip of winding Cornish coast road which was the only way to St Eval Such a trip would no doubt be a nightmare in the winter and if severe weather conditions set in the road would probably become impassable. Some sort of midday meal was provided at St Eval and of course N.A.A.F.I. had as Usual managed to keep going. Between five and six o鈥檆lock we were then picked up again by the service transport to make the trip back to Newquay leaving behind just the flight duty crews to continue with the night flying duties.

On looking around St Eval. We discovered what must have been the anti-aircraft defence system. This was a device, which I think was known as Unrifled Projectors and to consist of clusters of rocket-propelled cables. It seemed that a rocket with a cable attached was fired electrically from a tube in the ground with the idea that the cable would catch onto the diving enemy plane thus causing it to crash. Obviously it had been a complete failure as although there were hundreds of these rocket cables ready to be fired at the time of the blitz it was apparent they had not been fired and had little effect on the enemy raiding force that had devastated the place.

So it can be seen that the sort of conditions prevailing at St Eval by 1941 were obviously not very conducive to the smooth running of any R.A.F. Squadron but we were a very experienced outfit and our role at first would be one of waiting and watching so we would not be under any immediate pressure and given a bit of time we would no doubt settle in and regain the high performance levels expected of 233 letter marking Z.S.

By late March of 1941,in fact, two German Battleships had appeared in the Western approaches the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau and although the hope amongst 233 Squadron was that they would keep going we knew when they slipped into Brest on the morning of the 22nd that we would be stuck in this place of St Eval for as long as these ships remained in dock there.
233 Squadron at that time was using the normal squadron set up with three flights A, B and C with each flight consisting of around about ten Lockheed Hudson鈥檚 per flight. 鈥淎鈥� flight would be our front line flight backed up by 鈥淏鈥� with all the required, 鈥淪trike鈥� aircraft and 鈥淐鈥� would take care of training duties etc. In practice of course there would be a good deal of friendly competition between the flights to make each as good as one another. In addition there would be a workshop flight, which carried out all major airframe and engine repairs and overhauls. The Squadron worked strictly to the prepared maintenance schedule as laid down by the R.A.F starting with the D.I. or daily inspection and working through the periods of flying time to the complete overhaul of airframe and engine changes. Form 700 being the mainstay of the maintenance schedule wherein all work done on each aircraft would be logged.

It was at the beginning of June 1941 that our aircrews reported the presence of a third German Battleship in the Western end Of the English Channel and this turned out to be the Prinz Eugen bound also for Brest to join the two ships already there the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
By now 233 Squadron had settled down to a very busy pattern of flying activity with a twenty four hour watch over Brest and the immediate area of English Channel. Two patrols had been set up the first one was naturally to retain a constant watch over Brest and the docks area where the Battleships lay and the name for that one was quickly coined by all concerned 鈥淪TOPPER". Aircrews would be flying the stopper while ground personnel would be working on stopper aircraft or waiting for stopper to arrive back or seeing stopper off the word became just part of normal squadron language. The second patrol while of equal importance never seemed to have the same impact on us as did stopper. The second patrol was on a line between Ushant just off Brest and Jersey in the Channel Isles running east to West and became known as "Line S.E."

These two patrols in theory made it impossible for any movement of the Battleships in Brest to pass undetected by our planes and we were certain of this because as the year wore on the precision and regularity with which we were now carrying out these patrols was fast reaching one hundred per cent performance.
The possibility of the three Battleships breaking out of Brest and making a dash up Channel for a German based port was now considered to be their only possible choice.

Joubert knew he had the right men in the right place and that whatever else happened he could be sure that immediately the Battleships moved he would know about it. Having made certain of the most important aspect of any such movement Joubert felt able to allow the rest of his command to continue with all Other war time demands in the knowledge that when the time came the 3-4 hours warning time would allow for all necessary action to be taken.

All other branches of the R.A.F and the other services Navy and Army, was also dependant on this early warning from 233 Squadron so that they could take action accordingly.233 Squadron also took part in the various Bombing raids on Brest as and when they were laid on and extra planes would be called for from time to time for special reconnaissance and photographic work connected with the Battleships in dock there. We also still played our part in the Battle of the Atlantic with anti "U" boat patrols and strike aircraft ready whenever a 鈥淜i11" was thought possible.

In all, bearing in mind the sort of conditions prevailing at St Eval which even now was still receiving some attention from German bombers at night we were to say the least a very active air force squadron.
The summer of 1941 quickly came and went with 233 still playing the waiting and watching game over Brest.
It was in September that a warning was sounded of the worsening naval situation in the Mediterranean when a report came through telling about the activity of Italian submarines in the waters around Gibraltar.
Apparently a submarine had been able to despatch two midget subs on course for the harbour there and these in turn had successfully attached mines to two merchant Ships at anchor both ships being blown up and sunk. As a anti "U" boat outfit ourselves the news interested us and we speculated on how was it possible for a submarine to carry out such a manoeuvre at such close quarters and get clean away. However we concluded that it was just an isolated incident that might happen any time with a war going on little realising that in the very near future we would be sharply reminded that all was not well in that part of the world.
Autumn 1941 arrived and with it came reports and photographs that suggested that the three German Battleships in Brest might try to break out almost any time in the near future and although our patrols over Brest and up and down the Channel had now become almost clockwork routine efforts were intensified by all concerned to make absolutely sure there would be no escape for the Battleships by way of the Channel.
November seemed to start well enough with everything ticking over nicely when suddenly right out of the blue came the news that on the 13th the Ark Royal had been sunk by U boat action only 30 miles off Gibraltar.

Almost immediately the impact of this sinking was felt throughout 233 Squadron and as the days passed the intense interest we had been experiencing over the Battleships at Brest seemed to change to one of complete apathy. It was difficult at the time to fully appreciate why such a change had taken place but with the passing of time and as some facts became known it could be seen the sort of problem and dilemma he high command had thrust upon them with the news that the Ark Royal had been sunk and how 233 Squadron became very much involved in that problem.

The High Command grasped immediately the serious implications of this sinking and realised it could be the start of a planned attack by U Boats to gain a complete control of the seas around Gibraltar and thus to effectively blockade the island with all the inherent consequences such a disaster would have meant to England.

It was simple really, sink the Ark Royal thus removing all air cover in the area then all 鈥淯鈥� Boats could move in and be ready to annihilate the convoy of merchant ships due to leave Gibraltar, homeward bound, on the 14th. December and after that it would be easy with the help of all the Italian sea power available to completely take over at Gibraltar.
Even with the Ark Royal the navy's strength at the Western end of the Mediterranean was at rock bottom but without the Ark Royal all that was left were two Cruisers and about five destroyers while at the command of the enemy in Italian harbours were five Battleships, ten six inch Cruisers, eighty (80) destroyers and about seventy submarines plus all the war planes they wished to use. Probably all that was needed was something like the U Boats plan to have succeeded and that very powerful force may well have been tempted out in the open.
Politically as well our High Command had their hands full with what they were now confronted with at Gibraltar.
For a long time past the possible collaboration between Spain and Germany had been a touch and go affair as the Germans badly wanted passage through Spain for her troops. To have to admit openly that there was even a threat to security at Gibraltar could well have tipped the balance in favour of allowing the Germans in.
Would the German high command now realise to the full the initiative their 鈥淯鈥� Boats had now gained for them, the ball was in their court.

The problem now was to provide air cover for the convoy that would be leaving Gibraltar on December 14th.One thing that had been confirmed by the loss of the Ark Royal was the fact that the time was long past for Swordfish aircraft to be relegated into obsolescence. Modern anti U boat aircraft had to be far more of a ruthless weapon than those old string bags and had to be large enough to carry all the most modern equipment that could be worked at in as comfortable way as possible. The only aircraft that could possibly be used in any attempt to provide air cover for Gibraltar was now in Use with Coastal Command in growing numbers the American Lockheed Hudson.
Sir Phil1ip Joubert Chief of Coastal Command was quickly consulted about the feasibility of operating such air cover from Gibraltar and could only reply that he doubted it was possible, as no suitable runway existed in the area that could accommodate such aircraft as Hudson鈥檚. However Joubert agreed to carry out some flight evaluation tests and 233 Squadron was alerted to carry out these very secret flight tests.
Two Hudson鈥檚 made the return flight to Gibraltar and reported back to Joubert that the space provided at North Front did offer the possibility of operating Hudson aircraft but, they needed to be crewed, by the most experienced aircrews avai1able.

Joubert reported to the High Command that the possibility of using North Front at Gibraltar as a base for the very urgent emergency anti "U" Boat operations in support of the navy when escorting the homeward bound convoy could be considered feasible. Operations of the sort that could be for seen could
Only be carried out on condition that only very experienced pilots and crews undertook the task. In all ten such pilots and crews were available all within 233 Squadron this was the minimum requirement. To take those aircrews out of this squadron would render it useless for its present task at St Eval. To replace 233 Squadron at St Eval at such a time when movement of the German Battleships at Brest was beginning to look eminent put the chance of an early warning that they were on the move very low indeed. Success at Gibraltar could not be assured, as the hazards to such an undertaking were tremendous.

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